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Legal Fees in Nonbusiness
Administrative Claims
By ALAN GOLDHAiMEMR*
FEW parties appear before such administrative agencies as the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission or the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion without the assistance of counsel. In contrast, claimants seeking
social security pension benefits, veterans' pensions, unemployment ill-
surance benefits, and supplemental social security income benefits
rarely avail themselves of legal representation. For example, only 5
percent of all social security claimants are represented by attorneys dur-
ing the administrative stages of the proceedings.' As a result, rel-
atively few attorneys are active in the field, even though this nonbus-
iness side of administrative advocacy affects the average American as
much as our judicial system. The problem of nonrepresentation of
claimants in nonbusiness administrative proceedings is exacerbated by
restrictive laws winch have greatly limited the economic incentive to
practice in this area of administrative law.2 Although such legislation
was originally passed to protect the claimant from the overreaching at-
torney, the actual effect of these laws has been to preclude all legal
representation, with a resulting loss to the claimant of a necessary ally
in the administrative proceeding.
Since the poor form the bulk of those seeking governmental bene-
fits, limitations on access to attorneys create barriers to effective repre-
sentation of those on the lower end of the economic scale. At a time
when differences m the legal rights of the wealthy and the poor are
* Hearing Examiner, Board of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Adminis-
tration. A.B., 1963, Umversity of Califorma, Los Angeles; J.D., 1966, Harvard Law
School. This article was submitted and accepted for publication prior to the author's
appointment to his present position.
1. Yarowsky, Attorneys' Fees in Social Security Proceedings, 17 U. KANS. L.
Rnv. 79 (1968).
2. See text accompanying notes 25-49 mfra.
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theoretically at a minimum, the cost of an attorney should be an unim-
portant factor in obtaining equal representation. Nevertheless, statu-
tory restrictions on attorneys' fees discourage professional practice and
intensify the relative inability of the poor to obtain counsel.
In almost every other area of the law, attorneys may freely con-
tract with clients; only in the case of governmental benefit or insurance
programs has the client's need for protection from attorneys been ac-
corded statutory recognition. Yet protecting clients from attorneys, by
effectively prohibiting attorney representation, is a far-reaching pro-
phylactic measure which overlooks both the advocacy nature of admin-
istrative proceedings and the expertise which agencies can bring to bear
in support of their positions. This unfortunate exclusion of attorneys
is caused by a failure to recognize that law is a business which will be
practiced only if a profit can be made.
The Attorney's Role in Administrative Actions
An Overview
The right to litigate is not meaningful without the right to counsel,
and the right to counsel presupposes the practical ability to obtain coun-
sel. Absent that practical ability, the rights to counsel and to redress
are without substance. Nonetheless, surveys have shown that low in-
come persons generally do not feel a need for legal representation in
noncommercial administrative proceedings. Because the community is
seen as not having developed a clear way of dealing with administrative
problems,3 the poor tend to adopt a passive approach to the administra-
tive process which results in a very conservative use of legal resources.4
3. B. CuRRAN, F. HECHT, D. MADDI & F. MARKS, UTILIZATION OF LEGAL SERVICES
iY THE PooR 41 (American Bar Foundation Series Pamphlet 1971); F. MARKS, TuE LE-
GAL NEEDs OF THE POOR 7 (American Bar Foundation Series Pamphlet, Limited Circu-
lation Draft 1971).
4. B. CL;RAN, F. HEcrr, D. MADDI & F. MARxs, UTmizATION OF LEGAL SERVICES
3Y THE POOR 47 (American Bar Foundation Series Pamphlet, Limited Circulation Draft
1971). Studies demonstrate that 83% of those with incomes over $15,000 have sought
the advice of an attorney sometime during their lives, while only 56% of those with
incomes below $7,000 have done so. Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Ade-
quacy of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of
the Senate Comm. on the fudiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973) (statement of Senator
Tunney) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Legal Fees].
The problem of nonrepresentation of the poor has been squarely addressed by Sena-
tor John V. Tunney of California: "In a government of laws, all citizens have a legal
right to redress of grievances and injustices. Crucial to the process of redress is the
lawyer. Yet, too often, citizens, untrained in law, fail to perceive what their rights and
remedies are. Too often they feel baffled by the complex maze of institutions and regu-
lations that surround them. Too often lawyers are unavailable to help citizens at rates
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The need for counsel in any society depends largely on the eco-
nomic consequences of legal action. For example, our society has deter-
mined that because of the great social and economic consequences
which befall a convicted criminal, no one should be convicted of a
crime without having an advocate on his side, even when counsel must
be provided at society's expense. While the stakes in governmental
benefit claims do not reach the proportions involved in criminal convic-
tions, they are clearly sufficient to warrant legal representation.
Although there are exceptions, such as claims involving the extent
of benefits, in practice, most unemployment, social security, or veter-
ans cases turn on the basic question of entitlement. For example, a
significant number of social security claims involve the right to total and
permanent disability benefits.5 The average disability claimant, in the
author's experience, 6 is fifty years of age and receives an award in ex-
cess of $200 monthly. Thus, the average amount at stake is $31,200-
the amount that would accrue, exclusive of interest, between age fifty
and age sixty-two, at which time the claimant would be eligible for re-
duced old-age benefits. Many claimants, however, are as young as
thirty years of age, in which case the stake may be as high as $80,200.
Moreover, disability awards do not include medical or dependents' bene-
fits,7 which may amount to thousands of dollars. The amount involved
in a veterans' or supplemental security income claim parallels social
security awards, and, even in the case of unemployment insurance bene-
fits, a typical California claim may amount to over $2,000.8
they can afford.
"The result: The erosion of basic constitutional and other legal rights; an im-
balance of advocacy in our legislative forums; a loss of faith in our governmental proc-
esses." Id. at 1.
5. See Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social
Security Disability Program, 1972 Dunn L.J. 681, 683-86 [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
6. The author has had extensive experience litigating governmental benefit
claims. From 1967 to 1969, he was associated with the Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles, first in the capacity of staff attorney, and later as Director of Major Case
Developments. Between 1969 and 1974, the author was in private practice in Los
Angeles, during which time he represented clients in administrative proceedings, primar-
ily those involving Social Security claims.
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 (dependents' benefits), 426, 1395c-9pp (Medicare bene-
fits) (Supp. I, 1973).
8. In California, the maximum weekly claim, calculated on the basis of past earn-
ings, is $90. CAL. UNnaaP. INs. CODE § 1280 (West Supp. 1974). Since these benefits
may be received for 26 weeks, the maximum amount which may be claimed would be
$2,340. Id. § 1281(b) (West 1972). In times of prolonged statewide unemployment,
however, federal and state laws provide for an extension of the period during which ben-
efits may be received. See Pub. L. No. 93-373, §§ 202(a)(1)-401 (Aug. 10, 1970);
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3501 (West 1972).
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Considering that social security or unemployment insurance bene-
fits may constitute a claimant's only source of future income, aside from
general relief funds, these claims are of paramount importance. Since
general relief funds in Los Angeles County, for example, usually pay
no more than $86 per month for a single person, 9 the ability to litigate
successfully involves the question of survival itself.
The necessity for effective representation is magnified by the vol-
ume of nonbusiness administrative claims. More than nine hundred
thousand social security disability claims are filed annually, and nearly
50 percent of these claims are denied on initial application."0 Some
fifty thousand denials of social security claims occur every month." De-
nials of veterans' claims exceed twenty thousand each year. 2 In Cal-
ifornia, well over one hundred thousand unemployment insurance
claims are filed monthly, and a large percentage of these are denied.' 3
These figures clearly demonstrate the need not merely for attorneys,
but for attorney specialists, particularly in light of the complexity of the
administrative process.
The Claimant Versus the Agency: The
Need for an Advocate
Administrative claims involve issues as complicated as other mat-
ters in which attorneys are customarily involved. A social security
claim may go through as many as four administrative stages: applica-
tion, reconsideration, hearing, and appeal.' 4 When the administrative
decision is finalized, recourse is available in the federal courts.'" Al-
though the potential harm in proceeding without counsel at the initial
application and reconsideration levels might be slight, the procedural
complexity of the hearing stage does warrant legal representation.
The hearing is a trial-type proceeding, demanding all the traditional
9. CALIF. DEP'T OF SOCIAL WELFARE, AR 1-15, PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA
(1972-73) (Table 23).
10. Dixon, supra note 5, at 683.
11. Yarowsky, Attorneys' Fees in Social Security Proceedings, 17 U. KANS. L.
REv. 79 (1968).
12. Hearings on Legal Fees, supra note 4, at 515 (statement of Raymond T. Bon-
ner).
13. In November 1973, for example, 195,125 initial claims were received. U.S.
Dm'T oF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE STATISTICS 1 (Mar.-Apr. 1974). For the
year 1973, there were 358,331 total denials. Id. at 21.
14. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.905, .909-.910, .917, .939-.942 (1974). When review
of a determination made subsequent to a hearing is sought by a party, the Appeals Coun-
cil has the power to deny the request for review. Id. § 404.947.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. II, 1972).
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skills of an attorney: examination of witnesses (including experts), prep-
aration of documentary evidence, and presentation of legal precedents
and other bases for decision.1 6 Moreover, the appeals stage, initiated by
a request for review by the Appeals Council17 normally requires exten-
sive written briefs' 8 analyzing intricate medical data. Finally, if judicial
review is allowed, the claimant proceeds in the United States District
Court, a forum which, with its formal rules and procedures, is clearly no
place for a novice.
Challenging Expert Testimony
Most claims for social security, supplemental income, and vet-
erans' benefits involve the determination of disabilities with respect to
which medical science is extremely inexact. Were the determination
of disability to consist merely of an evaluation of the individual claimant
against an objective standard, it is possible that attorneys would not be
necessary; however, the statutes wisely call for subjective assessment
of whether the particular individual can or cannot work.'9 Questions
concerning the individual's motivation, his capacity for rehabilitation,
and his ability to obtain and hold work are inevitably involved. Since
disability usually results from more than one impairment, a simplistic
system for measuring disability is impractical."0
In a personal injury or workmen's compensation case, litigants re-
sort to attorneys in part because they are aware that legitimate medical
evaluations may differ from doctor to doctor. Although both sides may
concur on the issue of liability, a trial may be necessary to determine
the extent of medical impairment. In such trials, our system of justice
requires that the trier of fact determine which doctor has the best com-
mand of the facts and the best reasons for his evaluations.
These considerations, inherent in any adversary context involving
use of expert testimony, apply to administrative claims as well. Yet
the average person requesting social security, veterans', or supple-
mental income benefits, with a high school education and a work his-
16. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.927-.930 (1974) (conduct of hearing).
17. Id. § 404.946; Dixon, supra note 5, at 698-99.
18. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.948-.949 (1974).
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1970); CAL. UNIEP. INs. CoDE § 2626 (West
1972). See also Townend v. Cohen, 296 F. Supp. 789, 791 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
20. With respect to veterans' claims, where representation of a claimant is, in ef-
fect, prohibited, the need for attorneys is perhaps the greatest, for the problem of deter-
mining liability is uniquely difficult Not only are the stakes high, but also such claims
frequently involve an assessment of the percentage of disability caused by a service-re-.
lated illness or injury. Intricate factual determinations are thus involved.
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tory in unskilled or semiskilled labor, is no match for the medical and
vocational experts called by the administrative agency. Although the
expert opinion is neutral, and may be favorable to the claimant, the
expertise needed to recognize and emphasize such testimony is be-
yond the layman's capability: the applicant simply does not know
how to bring out favorable aspects of expert testimony. This factor
is particularly critical in cases where there are no objective signs of dis-
ability, such as when pain is of hysterical or psychogenic origin, or when
x-rays and other tests are inconclusive. This lack of supporting objec-
tive evidence creates a predisposition to disbelieve the claimant repre-
senting himself. An attorney, therefore, is essential for effective chal-
lenge of agency findings.
The author has been involved in several cases in which advisors
to the agency testified that there was no objective disability, even
though the claimant was in a wheelchair and unable to work. Although
such testimony was ultimately disregarded, the extent of cross-exam-
ination necessary to reveal the inaccuracy and inadequacy of the testi-
mony would have been beyond the capabilities of the average claimant
or paraprofessional.
An attorney is necessary not only to contest the positions taken
by agency experts, but also to provide access to independent doctors
who can provide a more favorable diagnosis. The claimant needs doc-
tors who will seek to verify the symptoms rather than to disprove them,
assuming an impairment truly exists. Frequently, the reason for denial
of governmental benefits is the agency's use of a doctor who lacks ex-
pertise in the appropriate field. An attorney experienced in litigating
these matters can ensure that appropriate expert testimony is obtained.
In addition, claimants generally cannot afford the best medical
attention. The claimant without an attorney is at the mercy of his local
doctor who often lacks the time or desire to write a detailed medical
evaluation. Local physicians' reports may be conclusory, unconvincing,
or unintelligible. In contrast, physicians used by the agency are trained
to write reports which appear comprehensive. One may find, however,
that what appears to be a detailed report is actually a stock letter,
based only on a cursory check-up, which bears little relationship to
the claimant's situation. The attorney, then, is also needed to make
certain that the agency's doctors have taken the time to evaluate thor-
oughly the claimant's complaints and symptoms.
Investigatory Functions
The hearing, the most important stage of any administrative pro-
1132 [Vol. 26
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ceeding, provides the primary opportunity for the claimant to present
evidence.21 Here, an attorney's knowledge and experience can be es-
sential to a successful outcome. Investigation is ordinarily beyond the
resources of the average claimant, and inadequate factual investigation
is often the principal reason for appellate reversal. Frequently, the
claimant suffers from symptoms, but the perceptible signs of disease
do not appear by the date of the hearing. Proper inquiry by an at-
torney in such a case can lay the groundwork for a later reopening of
the administrative claim when objective evidence of disability finally
appears. In other cases, the claimant acts as his own enemy in present-
ing his claim. By failing to bring out symptoms which are embarrass-
ing, or by exaggerating irrelevant symptoms to substantiate a claim, a
disabled person, without benefit of counsel, may appear to lack credi-
bility.
Although unemployment insurance cases involve little expert testi-
mony, the unemployed worker whose claim has been denied at initial
application usually faces determined opposition. The employer, hav-
ing a truly adverse interest, may use either attorneys or experienced
lay representatives to defeat unemployment insurance claims. These
claims often involve issues of credibility. For example, the employer
may claim that the worker walked off the job, while the worker main-
tains that he was fired; or the workers may assert that he accidently
damaged merchandise, while the employer claims the act was delib-
erate. Cross-examination is vital in these cases.
In the typical case, the employer's witnesses are the employee's
supervisors, who are, quite often, more educated, more sophisticated,
and better prepared than the claimant. In short, they make more fav-
orable impressions as witnesses. The employee who represents him-
self often cannot effectively present his case; for example, subpoena-
ing witnesses or cross-examining supervisors is beyond the average
claimant's capabilities. Moreover, as is true of all noncommercial ad-
ministrative cases, the administrative judge is seldom able to bridge the
gap between deciding the facts and investigating the truth. Compromis-
ing primarily because of a heavy hearing schedule, the judge is likely to
act more in a traditional judicial role. The result is that the claimant's
21. The claimant must, of course, submit evidence of entitlement to benefits upon
initial application, if requested by the administration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.905 (1974). At
the hearing, however, the claimant for the first time is able to offer witnesses, including
experts, to produce documentary evidence, and thus to explain his case to the hearing
examiner in a more formal manner. See id. §§ 404.927, .934.
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version of the facts is not investigated thoroughly, unless the claimant
has an advocate.
Attorneys have been shown to have a dramatic impact upon non-
business administrative claims. In social security proceedings, for ex-
ample, despite the four-step administrative process, agency decisions
are regularly reversed by the federal courts.2 2  Statistics for the years
1960 through 1970 show that hearing examiners reversed 38 percent
of the cases that came before them; when an attorney was involved,
the reversal rate climbed to 54 percent. This percentage was even
higher when the attorney presented expert witnesses.23
In summary, attorneys are needed in nonbusiness administrative
actions, because the stakes are high and claims are settled through an
adversary system. The claimant must have someone who can obtain
and evaluate favorable evidence and counter the effect of unfavorable
evidence. The present inability of most claimants to obtain effective
representation conflicts with current notions of justice, particularly since
decisions in this area determine eligibility for benefits necessary to basic
subsistence.2 4
Statutory Limits on Attorneys' Fees
Restraints on access to attorneys are due in large measure to statu-
tory limits on attorney compensation in nonbusiness administrative pro-
ceedings. Such limitations are illustrated by statutory provisions gov-
22. A study by District Court Judge Feinberg noted that in volumes 227 to 236
of the Federal Supplement, decisions by the secretary of the Social Security Administra-
tion were reversed or remanded 47 times and upheld only 27 times. Scott v. Celebrezze,
241 F. Supp. 733, 736 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In a similar review of reported cases over
a three month period, District Court Judge Higginbotham observed that the government
was reversed 75% of the time. Seldomridge v. Celebrezze, 238 F. Supp. 610, 620 n.17
(E.D. Pa. 1964). See also Floyd v. Finch, 441 F.2d 73, 77 (6th Cir. 1971) (McAllis-
ter, J., dissenting).
23. Dixon, supra note 5, at 718, 721 & n.191. Mr. Dixon suggests that since the
merit of the application is initially determined by medical experts, the reversal rate may
be due largely to the inexpertness of hearing examiners (id. at 718), who generally have
a legal, not a medical, background. Mr. Dixon, however, fails to recognize that the
hearing represents the claimant's first face-to-face confrontation with the trier of fact
during which the combined effect of several impairments may be recognized for the first
time. In addition, particularly if counsel appears to aid in the presentation of the facts,
consultative examinations for inadequately diagnosed or undisclosed impairments are of-
ten made. Finally, true disability often may not become apparent until this time. Thus,
it is not surprising that there exists a high reversal rate; indeed, increased representation
of claimants would lead to a dramatically higher reversal rate.
24. The Supreme Court has recently noted that governmental benefits essential to
basic sustenance are of greater constitutional significance than are other forms of entitle-
ments. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
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erning claims involving veterans' benefits, unemployment insurance,
welfare benefits, and social security compensation. These statutory
schemes illustrate different attitudes toward the attorney-client re-
lationship, ranging from suspicion on the part of the Veterans Admin-
istration to openness on the part of those who administer unemploy-
ment compensation. In all of the statutory schemes, however, there
is a failure to recognize the legal profession as a business in which at-
torneys need protection from clients as much as clients need protection
from attorneys. It is enlightening, however, to contrast these statutory
schemes with workmen's compensation proceedings, in which attorneys
participate as a rule rather than as an exception.
1. Veterans' Benefits. The Veterans' Act of July 14, 1862, lim-
ited attorneys to fees of five dollars for representing or assisting vet-
erans.2" In 1864, the maximum fee was magnanimously raised to ten
dollars;26 although the upper limit has not remained constant, the cur-
rent ceiling is that of the Civil War period. 7 In addition any person
who "solicits, contracts for, charges, or receives" fees in violation of the
statutory maximum is subject to a five hundred dollar fine or two years
imprisonment at hard labor or both.28
As recently as 1971, a court of appeals stated: "The ten dollar
limitation statute was enacted to protect just claimants from improvi-
dent bargains and to prevent unjust claims."29  A more sympathetic
court declared that "[ten dollars] today can scarcely compensate the
attorney for getting his automobile out of the parking lot and starting
for the government bureau and parking it again at the place where he
must perform his legal ministrations." 30 Nonetheless, the law restricting
25. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 6, 12 Stat. 568.
26. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 12, 13 Stat. 389. For a chronological history
of the statutory changes with respect to attorney fees for representing veterans, see
Hearings on Legal Fees, supra note 4, at 458-59 (statement of John J. Corcoran,
General Counsel, Veterans' Administration).
27. See 38 U.S.C. § 3404(e) (1970). This section provides: 'The Administrator
shall determine and pay fees to agents or attorneys recognized under this section in al-
lowed claims for monetary benefits under laws administered by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration. Such fees... shall not exceed $10 with respect to any one claim ...."
The maximum permissible fee has not always remained constant since 1864; it of-
ten vacillated with the type of benefit the veteran was claiming. Since 1924, however,
the ten dollar maximum has applied to all attorney fees for representation of veterans.
Act of June 29, 1936, ch. 867, § 201, 49 Stat. 2032; Act of March 4, 1925, ch. 553,
§ 17, 43 Stat. 1311; Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 320, § 500, 43 Stat. 628.
28. 38 U.S.C. § 3405 (1970).
29. Hoffmaster v. Veterans Admin., 444 F.2d 192, 193 (3d Cir. 1971).
30. In re Descamp's Estate, 405 Pa. 331, 338, 175 A.2d 827, 830-31 (1961).
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attorney fees is still very much in effect.31
2. Unemployment Insurance. Unemployment insurance stat-
utes, on the other hand, do not restrict the attorney-client agreement,
but unemployment insurance proceeds are exempt from the claims of
the employee's creditors including the claimant's attorney. 2 In Califor-
nia, the unemployment insurance litigant must pay his own fees at ad-
ministrative and court levels, regardless of the outcome.13  In some
states, the agency is required to pay a specified amount to the attorney
who represents a successful claimant at the court level. 34  Only Ne-
braska allows the agency to pay an attorney who represents a success-
ful claimant at the administrative level. a5
3. Welfare Claims. Attorneys for successful claimants in wel-
fare cases in California may be awarded fees for representation at the
court level only.36 In Los Angeles County, where the author has liti-
gated numerous welfare claims, fees tend to be awarded at a reasonable
31. See Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85 (1938); Gostovich v. Valore, 153 F. Supp.
826 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Hearings on Legal Fees, supra note 4, at 512 (statement of Ray-
mond T. Bonner).
32. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODa § 988 (West 1972); N.Y. LABOR LAW §
595 (McKinney 1965); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 49.48.090 (1962).
33. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1958 (West 1972). Costs may be awarded
if an employer has acted in bad faith.
34. Bellar, Claimant Representation in UI Adjudication Proceedings, UNEMP'.oY-
MENT INS. REv., Jan. 1968, at 1, 5 [hereinafter cited as Bellar]; see, e.g., ALASKA SrAT.
§ 23.20.470(b) (1972); 15 FLA. STAT. § 443.16(2) (1966 & Supp. 1974-75); ME. RLv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1044(2) (Supp. 1973-74); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-646 (1968); N.Y.
LABOR LAW § 538 (McKinney 1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 44-57(c) (1969); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 50.32.160 (Supp. 1974); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 706(n) (1966).
An indication of the importance of such statutes to the proper representation of
claimants can be found in Waite v. Employment See. Bd. of Review, 108 R.I. 177, 273
A.2d 670 (1971). In Waite, the claimant obtained a disability award after a court bat-
tle, yet the attorney's request for fees, based on § 28-44-57(c) of the General Laws of
Rhode Island, was denied, since that statute authorizes an award of attorney fees only
if an unemployment insurance claim is litigated. The applicable statute for disability
awards (§ 28-41-31) allowed a reasonable attorney fee, but did not specify that it be
paid by the state. Whether resulting from a desire to keep attorneys out of administra-
tive proceedings, or a decision to save the state money, or a refusal by a court to deal
with legislative oversight, this unfortunate outcome discourages representation by attor-
neys.
Melvin L. Bellar, general counsel for the Louisiana Division of Employment Secur-
ity, has noted that even in states making provision for payment of fees, claimants do
not appear to have been greatly assisted in obtaining representation. This lack of rep-
resentation is attributed to the general apathy of the bar and a failure on the part of
the respective agencies to acquaint attorneys and the public with the pertinent statutory
provisions. Bellar, supra.
35. Bellar, supra note 34, at 5; see Na. Rnv. STAT. § 48-646 (1968).
36. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10962 (West 1972).
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hourly rate, without consideration for the contingent nature of the liti-
gation. Court-awarded fees are paid directly to the attorney; however,
legal process is not available to compel additional payment out of the
award for work performed at administrative levels."
4. Social Security Benefits. The Social Security Administration
uses the most intricate system for determining the award of attorney's
fees. Any fee, whether contingent or hourly, must ultimately be approved
by the administration or the courts.38 For services resulting in a judi-
cial decision for a claimant, the statute allows the payment of reason-
able fees, limited to a maximum of 25 percent of the total past due
benefits.89
Curiously, the administration's discretion in awarding fees is far
greater than that of the federal courts. Attorneys' fees for representa-
tion at administrative levels are not subject to any absolute limit; how-
ever, only 25 percent of the past due benefits may be paid directly
to the attorney.40 A petition must be filed with the agency which in-
cludes an itemization of services, the dates services began and ended,
the amount of fee desired, and the amount and itemization of ex-
penses. 41  The petition must be sent to the claimant, who has the right
to object to the amount requested by the attorney. 42  The petition is
then evaluated according to the purpose of the program, that of pro-
viding a measure of economic security for its beneficiaries. In addi-
tion, the administration considers the nature of the services performed,
the complexity of the case, the level of skill and competence required
to render services, the amount of time spent on the case, the result
achieved, the level of administrative review to which the claim was
carried, the level of review at which the representative entered the pro-
ceedings, and the amount of the fee requested, excluding expenses.43
In sharp contrast to the grudging treatment of attorneys under the
37. See id. § 11002.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
39. Id. § 406(b)(1). Compare Ray v. Gardner, 387 F.2d 162, 165 (4th Cir.
1967), with Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 1972). In Ray the court
overturned a district court's award of attorneys' fees covering both judicial and admin-
istrative proceedings, holding a court had no jurisdiction to award fees for the latter.
The Webb court held that the final tribunal which upholds the claim for benefits may
award up to 25% of past due benefits for costs of all services performed by an attorney
in securing the benefits. Cf. McDaniel v. Cohen, 288 F. Supp. 808, 812 (W.D. Va.
1968).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970).
41. 20 C.F.R. § 409.976(a) (1974).
42. Id. § 404.976(a)(7).
43. Id. § 404.976(b).
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Veterans' Act, 44 courts have acknowledged the need to compensate
adequately attorneys representing social security claimants.
Availability of lawyers to [sooial security] claimants is of the
highest importance . . . Charges on the basis of a minimal
hourly rate are surely inappropriate for a lawyer who has per-
formed creditably when payment of any fee is so uncertain. 45
A district court judge posited the problem of reasonable attorney fees
in cases involving social security benefits in the following manner:
Surely an attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee for services
rendered his client in prosecuting a claim in this court, and it is
as much the court's responsibility to see that a reasonable and ade-
quate fee is paid to claimant's attorney, as it is to see- that such
attorney does not receive an unreasonably large or unconscionable
fee for his services . . . . [T]o refuse to allow a claimant's attorney
a reasonable and adequate fee for his services rendered within the
limits prescribed by the Act. . . would make it exceedingly diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for many deserving claimants to obtain
proper legal representation to pursue and prosecute their deserving
and legitimate claims in -the District Court after they had been ar-
bitrarily denied by the Secretary and his minions.46
5. Workmen's Compensation. In California, attorneys are en-
titled to reasonable fees set by the Workmen's Compensation Commis-
sion.47 Most importantly, since fees can be paid directly to the attor-
ney in the full amount awarded by the commission, 48 collection prob-
lems are minimal. Fees are reviewable by the courts, which have no-
ted that a reasonable fee should not be less than is customarily awarded
for comparable services nor should they be so low as to discourage com-
petent attorneys from accepting compensation cases. 49  Thus, the
workmen's compensation statutes in California acknowledge that at-
torneys will practice only in areas offering remuneration similar to that
which can be earned in nonregulated fields. The contrasting lack of
attorney representation in social security, supplemental income, unem-
ployment compensation, or welfare cases may well be due to the fail-
ure of statutory craftsmen to recognize the necessity of an adequate fin-
ancial incentive.
44. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
45. McKittrick v. Gardner, 378 F.2d 872, 875 (4th Cir. 1967).
46. Mauldin v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 370, 372 (D.S.C. 1967).
47. See CAL. LA'.oR CODE §§ 4903 (a), 4906 (West 1971).
48. Id. §§ 4903(a)-04.
49. Bentley v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 75 Cal. App. 2d 547, 171 P.2d 532
(1946).
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Suggestions for Improvement of Legislation Regulating
The Attorney-Client Relationship
Even though legal skills are essential in an administrative context,
attorneys often practice under the delusion that the administrative
agency is a helpmate rather than an adversary. The author has re-
viewed numerous transcripts for appeal which indicated that an at-
torney, who never would have prepared a personal injury case with so
little care, improperly assessed his role as an advocate. Often such a
case is handled perfunctorily as a favor to a client, because an attorney
believes he will not be paid adequately if he spends the time to prepare
thoroughly. Such a system performs a disservice both to the client and
to the attorney. In many such instances, even the use of a paraprofes-
sional would inadequately serve the client, since the skills of an at-
torney are required. It is these skills which must be made available
at a price the client can afford.50
The obvious reason for the reluctance of attorneys to litigate
claims for veterans' benefits is the statutory limit on attorneys' fees.
Not only should the maximum fee be raised to encourage attorney in-
volvement, but also, to make the addition of counsel meaningful, judi-
cial review of veterans' claims should be permitted. 5
Veterans are represented presently by veterans' service organiza-
tions. These organizations are so closely related to the administration,
with personnel often moving between the agency and the organizations,
that they tend to act as processing agents rather than as advocates. 52
In this author's experience, veterans' organizations assist with minister-
ial details, such as the completion of forms, but they do not perform
the advocate's role of pursuing uncertain claims. Numerous denials of
apparently meritorious claims belie any contention that the existing sys-
tem is satisfactory.53
50. Noncommercial administrative claims impose even greater demands on the at-
torney than does the ordinary civil action. In the typical social security case, for exam-
ple, once the initial application and reconsideration stages are completed, settlements are
not permitted and an administrative appeal or trial is inevitable. The attorney's time in-
volvement is therefore necessarily more extensive when litigating administrative claims
than when arguing personal injury cases.
51. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970). At present a finding by the administration of
any law or fact in benefit cases is final.
52. Hearings on Legal Fees, supra note 4, at 463-64, 504, 518 (statements of Har-
old J. Nussbaum & Raymond T. Bonner). For arguments by these service organizations
in favor of continuing the existing system, see id. at 495-504 (statement of Charles E.
Mattingly & Edward Golembieski, American Legion).
53. See id. at 513-14 (statement of Raymond T. Bonner).
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In connection with unemployment insurance compensation claims,
the author has had a sufficient number of requests for representation
to believe that a significant percentage of claimants would be willing
to employ an attorney on a contingent basis after an initial denial of
benefits. The single most important deterrent to the author's repre-
sentation of such claimants has been the lack of protection against the
ungrateful client, who refuses to pay regardless of the efforts under-
taken by the attorney or the result achieved.
Unfortunately, even honest clients will find it difficult to obtain
counsel in unemployment insurance cases, since attorneys cannot dif-
ferentiate with any certainty the client who will keep his word from
the client who will not. The ungrateful client exists at all income levels
and stations of life; his appearance and actions are not necessarily dif-
ferent from those of the honest client. Faced with an unemployment
insurance claim, knowing that the client is in need of insurance pro-
ceeds, the attorney is justifiably skeptical of promises of payment on
a contingent basis, because he has no remedy if the client refuses to
pay. The result is a rejection of all such cases.
The unemployment insurance compensation system should be
modified to allow attorney liens for reasonable fees. One method
would be to require the attorney to register a fee agreement with the
administrative agency and to allow him to be paid directly from the pro-
ceeds in accordance with the agreement. A difficulty with contingent
agreements in administrative claims is that the amount at stake often
cannot be predicted with any accuracy. While a claim is filed for a
stated amount, disqualification of some of the period for which a claim-
ant seeks compensation may result in a smaller ultimate award. The
attorney, unable to compute the exact amount at stake, will protect
himself under the present system by demanding a high percentage of
the proceeds. Assuming a benevolent administration, the better sys-
tem would be to provide the agency with the authority to review fees
and to pay reasonable fees according to the particular case.
The problems of uncertain and uncollectable fees for legal serv-
ices with respect to social security claims are less severe. For work
performed at administrative levels, the Social Security Administration
will allow a reasonable fee; however, only 25 percent of the past due
benefits may be certified for direct payment to the attorney. 54  Al-
though this protection is often adequate, a single financial loss may dis-
courage further practice in this area, since the margin of profit on a
54. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (1970).
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successful case is slight. In addition, an attorney can frequently win
a case and yet be protected for only a negligible sum, because the back
award is extremely small. This result is common either when the client
is a marginal wage earner or when the onset date of disability permits
only a modest award. In such cases, 25 percent of the award is unfair
compensation for an attorney who has created a fund which continues
throughout the client's life.55
The social security system's provision for attorney fees is, on the
whole, commendable. Although some attorneys have objected to filing
a petition for fees as insulting,5 6 the petition is necessary, given the dan-
ger of overcharging clients for administrative work. Although various
factors account for the amount of the fee,5" awards are usually set at
a reasonable per hour rate. Unfortunately, this standard of remunera-
tion does not account for those claims which are not successful or
which, although rewarding for the client, do not adequately compensate
the attorney. Moreover, while attorneys must offer a reasonable per-
centage to the client in order to achieve the understanding requisite
to a proper attorney-client relationship, even a 40 percent maximum
can generate losses where the retroactive award is small.
Just as the limitation on the amount that may be certified for direct
payment for services at the agency level should be abolished, the 25
percent limitation on fees for litigation in the federal courts ought to
be removed. Again, the difficulty with the limitation is that the at-
torney is unable to predict the amount of the retroactive award. ,Con-
gress probably assumed 25 percent would be sufficient because the
time between initial application and petition to the district court, after
exhaustion of administrative remedies, is quite lengthy. The onset
date of disability, however, is not always what is claimed; it may be
set forward in the process of adjudication. The result is that the client
becomes entitled to benefits for life, but the attorney, who is paid only
out of the back award, gets very little for his efforts. Insofar as fixed
percentages create arbitrary results, the wiser approach would be to al-
low courts discretion in awarding attorneys' fees.
Personal injury cases attract attorneys because large recoveries
55. The limitation also creates a conflict of interest by rewarding the attorney who
delays his case and thereby creates a larger back award. Webb v. Richardson, 472 F.2d
529, 537 (6th Cir. 1972), quoting Blakenship v. Gardner, 256 F. Supp. 405, 410 (W.D.
Va. 1966).
56. Hearings on Legal Fees, supra note 4, at 1724 (letter of James H. Coleman);
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.976 (1974).
57. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
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compensate for cases that are lost. Society benefits because the contin-
gent fee allows the attorney to take a chance on doubtful claims. An
attorney who has not lost a case is probably not accepting enough diffi-
cult cases to benefit those who most need his services. Objection may
be raised, however, to large windfalls to attorneys who settle a personal
injury claim with apparently little effort. This criticism may be valid
with respect to personal injury cases, but there are no settlements of
administrative claims. The attorney is most often paid according to
time expended; thus, if only one out of ten cases is lost, the lawyer
may suffer a net loss. The agency should therefore take into account
the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the particular at-
torney's practice. To encourage development of expertise, lawyers
regularly engaged in administrative practice should be entitled to share
in high awards. Normally, past-due benefits are not large unless there
has been a series of denials. Overcoming such administrative adversity
is a tribute to the attorney's skill; therefore, recognition of the contin-
gent nature of representation should also take into account the attor-
ney's skill. In cases where the attorney's fee on a per hour basis would
not consume more than 25 percent of the award, additional compensa-
tion could easily be awarded, since the client would be left with a fair
share of the proceeds of litigation. 58
Another difficulty which discourages attorneys from litigating
claims for governmental benefits is delay in payment. The process-
ing of social security claims takes a considerable amount of time, but
this delay may benefit clients. But for this time lag, impairments often
would not be verifiable medically by the hearing date. Hence, if the
processing period were shortened, claimants might be barred from re-
filing under res judicata principles, even though new evidence of dis-
ability is available.
At the hearing level, the client normally receives an award from
the Social Security Administration 90 days after a favorable decision.
The attorney can then petition for his fees.59 The petition cannot be
made earlier, both because the amount involved is unknown ° and be-
58. Even in cases where the claimant is under an obligation to repay his retroac-
tive award to the claimant's disability insurer, the administration will neither honor the
attorney-client agreement nor recognize the contingent nature of the representation.
Surely an insurance company does not need economic protection against attorneys.
59. The attorney is authorized to petition for fees on completion of the proceed-
ings in which he represented a client. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.975(b)-.976 (1974).
60. The agency determines the amount to be awarded after a favorable decision
is rendered. Id. §§ 404.968-.969.
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cause the agency acting through the Appeals Council has 90 days
within which to review an adverse decision.61  After the attorney sub-
mits the petition, there is an additional delay of 60 to 180 days during
which the fee request is reviewed: this total delay of 150 days to 270
days before payment, after the bulk of the work is completed, renders
it difficult to practice economically, particularly since the waiting period
seems to be greatest when the award is high. To encourage adequate
representation, the post award delay in payment of attorney fees should
be drastically reduced.
Consideration could also be given to a requirement that the gov-
ernment bear the cost of attorneys' fees in litigation which results in
the award of benefits. If the agency has erroneously determined that
a claimant is not entitled to benefits, justice is not served when the
claimant is forced to pay counsel to right a wrongful act of the govern-
ment.62 Although our system of justice has traditionally been based
on the notion that each party will bear his own attorneys' fees,6" an
exception should perhaps be made when the state has denied a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement.64
It seems needless, however, to force the government to bear costs
for the vast majority of litigants who are able to pay attorneys from the
proceeds of litigation. At present, legal aid offices handle a significant
share of welfare and social security claims.6 5 The fact that society must
bear the costs of legal aid seems inappropriate, since, with slight modi-
fications in the existing structure, claimants could absorb legal costs. 66
61. Id. § 404.947. If a decision adverse to the agency is rendered in district court,
the length of the waiting period is affected by various factors, such as whether the case
is to be remanded, whether the attorney represented the client at only the judicial pro-
ceeding, or whether the attorney invested a substantial amount of time at the administra-
tive level.
62. Bellar, supra note 34, at 4-5.
63. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALF. L. Rnv. 792, 793 (1966). Were the loser invariably to bear the winner's attor-
ney's fees, low-income parties would be discouraged from instituting most litigation, par-
ticularly claims involving any degree of risk. See also Comment, Court Awarded At-
torney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rnv. 636, 637-55 (1974).
64. Bellar, supra note 34, at 6.
65. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 636, 682 (1974), in which it is indicated that the caseload
of the present legal aid system prevents those offices from adequately representing many
clients. The authors suggest that awards of fees to legal aid offices would remedy this
situation; however, at least with respect to governmental benefit claims, this remedy
would be unnecessary, if the restrictions on-access to private attorneys were removed.
66. There is, however, one major exception: Medicare claims. Such claims in-
volve too small an amount of past due benefits to support the use of a private attorney.
The present backlog of cases prevents legal aid societies from assisting most Medicare
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Legal aid would be a proper alternative only when the amounts in-
volved will not support employment of a private attorney,67 such as
when the award is small, or when a new principle of law is involved
which would entail litigation prohibitively expensive for the use of
private attorneys.
Conclusion
Attorneys practice their profession at a profit. So long as attor-
neys can, under the laws of supply and demand, earn more in particular
areas of the law, those areas will be greatly favored. If society is truly
concerned with the quality of legal representation of the poor, then
changes in the existing statutes governing nonbusiness administrative
claims are necessary in order to bring that system into conformity with
the basic economic principles at work in the legal profession.
At present, attorneys are infrequently employed in this field of liti-
gation because of statutory oversight with respect to the two most im-
portant business aspects of the legal profession-the adequacy and col-
lectability of fees. Attorneys' fees in welfare, social security, sup-
plemental income, veterans' administration, and unemployment insur-
ance cases could be made competitive with fees in other areas at little
real cost to the claimant. Since an attorney's services can greatly en-
hance the probability of obtaining an award, it is in the claimant's eco-
nomic self-interest to retain counsel even at the expense of a substantial
contingent fee. The present system not only protects claimants against
excessive fees, but also interferes with the freedom to choose whether
to employ an attorney. Without this freedom, protection against the
overreaching attorney is needless and the right to redress is lost.
claimants. Public subsidy of such cases could facilitate employment of private attor-
neys. For example, claimants could be required to pay up to 40% of an award, with
the federal government providing the balance of the legal fees, which would be deter-
mined according to a reasonable per hour rate of compensation.
67. The minority of cases, where insufficient amounts are involved, could also be
treated as small claims matters.
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